The Lancet article published online 11 October replicated, with a somewhat larger sample size, a 2004 study, also published in The Lancet and also done by researchers from Johns Hopkins Bloomberg Medical School. Yet the researchers ignored a United Nations survey of Iraqis, conducted about the same time as the first Lancet survey, that found very different results.
The 2004 Lancet article estimated that, between the US-led invasion of March 2003 and September 2004, 98,000 Iraqis died who would not have died had the invasion not occurred. The estimate had a 95% confidence interval of 8,000 - 194,000 deaths and was based on a cluster sample made up of 33 clusters of 30 households each for a total sample size of 988 households. (In one or two clusters, the full complement of households was not surveyed.)
The United Nations conducted its Iraq Living Conditions Survey (ILCS) between April and August 2004. As its name implies, the survey was aimed at gathering data on a broad spectrum of indicators of living conditions about one year after Saddam Hussein was deposed. Measures surveyed related to housing, infrastructure, demographics, child health, nutrition, education, condition of women, labour market activity, income and wealth, etc. Because the ILCS was a much more comprehensive survey, its findings were not published until March 2005, several months after the 2004 Lancet article.
The ILCS also produced an estimate of deaths since the invasion, but it was much lower than that published in the 2004 Lancet article. The estimate is discussed on p. 55 of the Analytical Report of the ILCS (pdf).
The number of deaths of civilians and military personnel in Iraq in the aftermath of the 2003 invasion is another set of figures that have raised controversy. The ILCS data indicates 24,000 deaths, with a 95 percent confidence interval from 18,000 to 29,000 deaths.
Although the ILCS estimate of 24,000 is far below the 2004 Lancet estimate of 98,000, there is a statistical sense in which they are not inconsistent, for the huge confidence interval of the Lancet estimate (8,000 - 194,000) easily encompasses the ILCS estimate's confidence interval (18,000 - 29,000). Statistically, however, one would conclude that the ILCS estimate is to be preferred because of its much smaller confidence interval, other things being equal.
The reason the confidence intervals differ so much in width is because the two estimates are based on different sample sizes. Both surveys used a cluster methodology of sample selection, but with different numbers of clusters and different number of households surveyed within each cluster. The Lancet survey selected 33 clusters from all of Iraq and then surveyed 30 households within each cluster. In the event, a total of 988 households were sampled. The ILCS selected 110 clusters from 17 of Iraq's 18 Governorates, with an additional 330 clusters from the remaining Governorate of Baghdad. Within each of the 2200 clusters, 10 households were surveyed. After removing six clusters due to operational considerations, the total sample size was 21,940 households.
The ILCS used over 66 times as many clusters and surveyed over 22 times as many households as did the Lancet survey. No wonder the ILCS's confidence interval was much more precise.
Based on the accompanying documentation, the ILCS was far superior to the Lancet survey across the whole gamut of survey operations. I won't go into details here, but those interested are referred to "Appendix 2: Technical Characteristics of the Living Conditions Survey Sample", found on pages 169-170 of the ILCS Analytical Report.
Despite the obvious superiority of the ILCS to the 2004 Lancet survey, the 2006 Lancet article contains no discussion of the ILCS or its estimate of Iraqi deaths between March 2003 and August 2004.
This I found odd. Articles in academic and professional journals that address topics of controversy generally include references to previously published studies and discuss the perspective the current article takes vis-à-vis the views and findings of those earlier studies. That is how scientific knowledge advances—by critically engaging published findings of other scholars and specialists.
The authors of the 2006 Lancet article, however, appear uninterested in critical engagement with the ILCS estimate of Iraqi deaths. Yet we know that the Lancet researchers are aware of the ILCS, for they refer to it twice in their footnotes. The first page mentions "surveys that assessed the burden of conflict on the population" and the fact that "insufficient water supplies, non-functional sewerage, and restricted electricity supply . . . create health hazards", and for these the ILCS is footnoted.
But as for critical discussion of the enormous difference between the ILCS estimate of deaths and the estimates generated from both Lancet surveys, the authors don't want to touch that. They don't even acknowledge its existence.
As I said, in my experience scientific knowledge is not built up by ignoring previous relevant studies, especially ones that differ so radically from one’s own study. That the researchers behind the 2006 Lancet article did so reinforces the belief that their real agenda is not scientific knowledge but advocacy.
Previous related post: Lancet study of Iraqi deaths is statistically unsound and unreliable









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[...] Lancet researchers ignored superior study on Iraqi deaths [...]
Nice analysis.
Elsewhere I’ve seen claims that other surveys in Iraq have gotten very high response rates. I haven’t actually checked that claim.
If true, I wonder whether that says something about the willingness of Iraqis to answer questions when surveyed by complete strangers, or whether it says something about the people doing the interviews.
Tim Lambert has tried to reconcile the ILCS figures with the Lancet figures by taking a subset of the Lancet figures and declaring them “war related”, and other violent death not “war related”. I am not sure how serious he is about that, and what he’s actually trying to say with it either.
Finally, I do have a problem with mortality figures in general, if you look at the ILCS, which is a large survey, and at infant mortality in particular you’ll see that there are some glaring inconsistencies, which the authors of the ILCS survey report point to, but cannot explain, namely neonatal mortality in the South is anomalously low compared to the Centre region, and the ILCS values of infant mortality for the 1990’s are in disagreement with previous large studies performed back then.
I wonder what’s actually been done to validate these kinds of studies.
http://www.blogger.com/comment.g?blogID=31109789&postID=116076033358959251
It seems they have commented in an email:
Some basics I can clarify:
Mortality rates clearly started to decline among children in Iraq in 2000 or 2001; they just didnt decline as much as they could have. The Min of Health in 2005 had only hospital data for comparisons, maeaning in a time of insecurity that no infomration was really available on the wider population of kids. Perhaps they are right that diarrheal death rates declined, I hope so; I havent seen these data.
The FAFO study[i.e. ILCS] doesnt provide guidance on the question of child mortality rates. Their death reporting is so far from ALL OTHER FIELD_BASED SOURCES that it cannot be believed. No surpise, as it was a total of 4 qustions out of 100 pages of interview.
We are comparing the survey data, most importantly the 1999 UNICEF survey, with census data, to get a better view. In the latter years, 1995 - 1998, the two agree closely on mortality rates around 100 or higher, and a rise from pre-sancitons period of 10% or more. This is likely the best info we will have, unless the 2007 census is surprisingly well done.
I am acutally working on this issue right now and will eventually have a paper on it to share with you.
Richard
The two surveys are not necessarily measuring the same thing. The Iraq Living Conditions survey speaks of deaths due to ‘warfare’ but it is unclear what they mean. Only violent deaths or perhaps on certain kinds of violent deaths? Does it include deaths due to increased crime after the invasion? How about insurgent deaths etc? It’s difficult to know exactly what they claim to measure from the online report.
The Lancet studies are much clearer. They are trying to estimate ALL excess deaths due to the increased mortality after the invasion. Many of these deaths are non-violent. According to the 2006 Burnham et al Lancet Study
In 2004, we did a survey of 33 randomly selected
clusters of 30 households with a mean of eight residents
throughout Iraq to determine the excess mortality during
the 17¬?8 months after the 2003 invasion. The survey
estimated excess mortality of at least 98 000 (95% CI
8000–194 000) after excluding, as an outlier, the high
mortality reported in the Falluja cluster. Over half of
excess deaths recorded in the 2004 study were from
violent causes, and about half of the violent deaths
occurred in Falluja.
The 2006 Lancet Study does cite the Iraq Living Condition survey by the way.
You need a preview button by the way.
Tom W,
I’ve looked for a WordPress plug-in to enable previews for users and been unable to find one. If you know of one, please let me know.
It’s true there is some ambiguity about “war-related” deaths, but I don’t think it’s a stretch to think that war-related deaths and violent deaths are very close.
In the post, I point out that the 2006 Lancet article does cite the ILCS. My point was that the Lancet authors do not discuss the ILCS estimate of war-related deaths, even though it: (1) differs widely from their estimate of “excess” deaths, and (2) has a much smaller confidence interval, indicating far greater precision.
Stat Guy;
The point is that the Lancet number includes a significant number of non-violent deaths and deaths due to criminal violence - both can be significant.
According to the last two columns of table 2 of the 2004 study accident related deaths more than doubled after the invasion, heart attacks and strokes nearly doubled, infectious diseases quintupled (they were small to start with) and neonatal deaths nearly doubled.
By my reckoning nearly half the excess deaths were non-violent once Falluja is excluded (the authors view it as singular and non-representative and so do I, it needs to be treated separately and then added in later. It’s not clear if the Iraqi Living Condition study includes Falluja.)
There are also significant number of the deaths due to increased criminality. According to the text 7 of the post invasion violent deaths were criminal (page 5) i.e. out of a total of 90 post-invasion deaths (subtracting out Falluja), roughly 44 are excess (given that the pre and post invasions populations are close) i.e. 15% of all excess violent deaths are criminal.
So if 50% of the excess deaths are non-violent and 15% of the remaining violent deaths are criminal that leaves between 40 and 45 thousand due to ‘warfare’.
There has been a significant revision in the breakdown of violent/non-violent deaths between the 2004 and 2006 Lancet studies. Even if one accepts the results of the two studies, given that 2006 had a larger sample, that would appear to be the one to prefer.
The 2006 study shows a drop in the non-violent mortality rate from 5.4 to 4.5 in immediate post-invasion period. (See Table 3.) Yet the 2004 study shows a sizeable increase in the non-violent death rate.
That does seem to suggest a larger proportion of violent deaths than the older study.
There remains a problem however. Using the larger sample size of the 2006 study, Burnham et al obtain the estimate 112 000 (69 000–155 000) (see page 6) for the same period as the 2004 study. In other words when they increase their sample size Burnham et al diverge even more from the Iraqi Living Conditions study.
Stat guy:
I’ve looked for a WordPress plug-in to enable previews for users and been unable to find one. If you know of one, please let me know.
http://weblogtoolscollection.com/archives/2004/05/20/coment-preview-for-wordpress-12/
[...] Lancet researchers ignored superior study on Iraqi deaths [...]
[...] Lancet researchers ignored superior study on Iraqi deaths [...]